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Abstract 
Empirical studies on the effects of fiscal policy using the conventional or data-based 
approach and the Blanchard-method of cyclical adjustment or the Blanchard Fiscal 
Impulse (BFI) discovered that fiscal consolidations can be expansionary, particularly in 
the case of spending-cuts. In this paper, it is stated this finding is affected by reverse 
causality, i.e. increasing GDP causally decreases expenditure-GDP-ratios if the cyclical 
adjustment strategy fails to correct for cyclical effects. It is also illustrated that the BFI 
as used in the literature does not appropriately control for cyclical effects in the case of 
expenditure-GDP-ratios and the resulting BFI is endogenously correlated with the 
economic cycle. This might explain why previous studies based on the BFI pointed to 
counter-intuitive findings when examining cuts in government expenditure. Replicating 
one prominent example of literature on expansionary austerity and comparing both the 
results based on the BFI and the results based on standard cyclical adjustment strategies, 
only the BFI-based results show expansionary effects of fiscal consolidations, while 
these effects disappear after applying standard methods of cyclical adjustment.   
 
Keywords: fiscal policy; fiscal adjustment, cyclical adjustment; reverse causality 
JEL Classifications: E 62, E 63, H 50 
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 A preliminary version of this paper has been presented at the annual conference of the European 
Economic Association 2015. I thank Pablo Hernández de Coz and Enrique Moral-Benito for kindly 
sharing their data, which is based on the data used in Alesina and Ardagna (2010). 
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1. Introduction 
One of the lively debated issues in today’s macroeconomic research is the question of 
the effects of fiscal policy. Since the European fiscal crisis, this debate gained political 
relevance because policy-makers around the world have been in search of an efficient 
way to reduce government debt levels. The idea of an “expansionary fiscal contraction” 
seemed to be one possible solution for the challenges of the time. 
Macroeconomic textbooks in the Keynesian tradition however suggest that fiscal 
expansions increase, while fiscal consolidations contract aggregate demand. A reduction 
of government deficit levels would thus decrease economic growth in the short run. On 
the other hand, a substantial amount of research on the macroeconomic effects of fiscal 
consolidations challenges this conventional wisdom and finds that  fiscal adjustments 
may have expansionary economic effects (‘expansionary austerity hypothesis’). This 
view was first expressed by Giavazzi and Pagano (1990) who discussed the 
expansionary effect of cases of fiscal adjustment in Ireland and Denmark during the 
1980s. Alesina and Perotti (1995)
2
 found first evidence for the expansionary austerity 
hypothesis in a large panel of OECD countries. They also pioneered the data-based 
approach and the application of the “Blanchard-method” for cyclical adjustment of 
budget data. In the aftermath, a number of papers built on the approach used in A&P 
(1995) to investigate the effects of fiscal policy.
3
 According to this stream of literature, 
fiscal consolidations are likely to be expansionary if the adjustment mainly takes place 
on the expenditure side, while tax increases are more likely to be contractionary 
(Alesina and Ardagna, 1998, 2010, and 2013).
4
 
To measure discretionary changes in fiscal policy, this approach investigates changes in 
the cyclically-adjusted primary balance (hereafter: conventional or data-based 
approach) and applies a cyclical adjustment strategy based on the so-called “Blanchard 
method” (hereafter: A&P approach).5 
                                                          
2
 Hereafter A&P. 
3
 See for instance Alesina and Perotti (1997), Alesina and Ardagna (1998, 2010, and 2013), and Ardagna 
(2004 and 2009).  
4
 Hereafter A&A (1998, 2010, and 2013). 
5
 The cyclical adjustment strategy is motivated by Blanchard (1990) and described by Alesina and Perotti 
(1995).  
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Critique of this approach is not new. In a comment on A&P, Kollintzas (1995) criticised 
that the cyclical adjustment strategy used in A&P (1995) might not capture the cyclical 
effects of the government budget balance so that the resulting “Blanchard Fiscal 
Impulse” (BFI) might not be an appropriate measure of a discretionary change in fiscal 
policy. Moreover, Giavazzi (1995) suggests that the results in A&P are influenced by 
accompanying monetary policies, in form of exchange rate devaluations, for example in 
the case of Ireland 1987.
6
 
At the beginning of the European fiscal crisis, there was a renewed interest in the effects 
of fiscal consolidations and potential expansionary effects. Against this background, 
A&A (2010 and 2013) provided new evidence on expansionary effects of fiscal 
consolidations in a panel of OECD countries. These studies have been frequently 
debated in recent literature.
7
 Leigh et al. (2010) and Guajardo et al. (2014) analysed 
historical records of fiscal adjustments and contrasted the conventional approach with 
the historical approach. Their results did not share the expansionary austerity view. 
Guajardo et al. (2014) illustrate that the fiscal indicator as used in A&A (2010) is 
correlated with GDP forecast revisions. The authors state that estimates based on the 
conventional approach appear to be biased towards overestimating expansionary effects, 
since the conventional approach entails one-offs operations in the budget balance. They 
also criticise that the cyclical adjustment strategy used in A&P (1995) and A&A (2010) 
neglects the effects of budgetary effects of changes in asset price. Jayadev and Konczal 
(2010) and Jordà and Taylor (2016) illustrate that the successful cases of fiscal 
adjustments in the AAP literature are in most instances associated with an economic 
upswing, an analysis that questions the exogeneity of the fiscal indicator used in the 
data-based approach. In this line, De-Cos and Moral-Benito (2013) illustrate that fiscal 
adjustment episodes as identified by AAP are not exogenous to economic growth and 
treat fiscal consolidations as weakly exogenous or predetermined, which points to the 
question of potential feedback effects and reverse causality. Moreover, De-Cos and 
Moral-Benito (2016) illustrate that the cases of fiscal adjustments identified by the 
narrative approach are not exogenous to GDP, as well. 
                                                          
6
 The same critique holds for the episodes examined in Giavazzi and Pagano (1990).  
7
 Refer to Blyth (2013) and Stiglitz (2016) for a comprehensive discussion and critique of the relevance of 
expansionary fiscal consolidations in the European fiscal crisis.  
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To account for potential endogeneity in the study of A&A (2010), Holden and Midthjell 
(2013) and Yang et al. (2015) applied alternative measures of discretionary change and 
illustrate that the expansionary effect of fiscal adjustments disappears after applying 
alternative strategies of adjusting the budgetary data, rather than adjusting with the 
Blanchard method. 
Since the Blanchard method used in A&P (1995) has been criticised for the (non-) 
recognition of fluctuations in asset prices and their effect on the budget balance 
(Guajardo et al., 2014), Yang et al. (2015) developed an indicator of fiscal impulse 
which controls for asset price fluctuations and discovered that the results are more in-
line with the narrative approach when the changes in the fiscal stance is measured with 
this alternative strategy. In this line, Holden and Midthjell (2013) discussed potential 
reverse causality in the study of A&A (2010) and illustrate that the tax multiplier is not 
greater, compared to the expenditure multiplier, if the CAPB is estimated with a 
modified strategy, rather than the strategy used by A&A. However, Holden and Midtjell 
(2013) and Yang et al. (2015) established a new strategy to adjust for cyclical effects 
rather than applying standard methods of cyclical adjustments. Moreover, no previous 
study discusses why and how the Blanchard method in A&P fails to adjust for cyclical 
effects, with the exception of neglecting changes in asset prices (Yang et al., 2015). 
This paper builds on previous critical analyses on expansionary austerity and illustrates 
that studies in the tradition of A&P using the BFI as an indicator of fiscal impulse are 
biased towards expansionary austerity if the cyclical adjustment strategy fails to correct 
the budget balance for cyclical effects. This cyclical adjustment problem in the method 
proposed by A&P and applied in A&A (1998, 2010, and 2013) is particularly 
pronounced in the case of government expenditure. This explains why the resulting 
multiplier in the literature based on the A&P method is biased towards expansionary 
results, particularly in the case of government expenditure. 
Different from previous critical studies, in this study a new fiscal indicator or a new 
strategy of fiscal adjustment is not developed. It is not only that the data-based approach 
in general does not take into account countercyclical policy response or that the CAPB 
does not correct for changes in asset prices, as argued by previous critical studies. 
Beyond that, section 2 of this paper illustrates that the strategy applied by A&P is in 
conflict with standard assumptions made in the literature on cyclical adjustment.  
 5   
 
Different from the assumptions proposed in the literature, the A&P method implicitly 
assumes an elasticity of government expenditure with respect to GDP of 1, while it is 
common in the literature so far to assume inelastic government expenditure (other than 
transfers). Section 3 summarizes the theoretical discussion and proposes testable 
hypotheses. The following empirical parts test these hypotheses based on the dataset 
used in A&A (2010) and contrast the A&P strategy with a CAPB based on a standard 
cyclical adjustment strategy.
8
 
Section 4 provides evidence for the hypothesis that the A&P fiscal indicator as used in 
A&A (2010) is not exogenous to economic growth and systematically correlated with 
the output gap, while the same is not true for the CAPB if standard assumptions are 
used on cyclically adjustment. As predicted in section 2, this systematic correlation 
appears to be particularly pronounced for the expenditure-GDP-ratio (computed by the 
strategy proposed in A&P), while the revenue side of the budget remains unrelated to 
the economic cycle, both for the A&P measure and the OECD measure. 
Section 5 analyzes large changes of the output gap, rather than large changes in the 
CAPB and illustrates that episodes with large changes in the output gap are very likely 
to be picked as an episode of large discretionary change if the A&P method, rather than 
the CAPB is used, as computed by the OECD. 
Replicating some of the results in A&A (2010), in section 6, the estimated effects are 
compared based on the CAPB computed with the strategy of A&P with the CAPB 
computed with the OECD method (Girouard and André, 2005). In line with the 
hypotheses formulated in section 3, it is shown that the results based on the Blanchard 
measure provide evidence for expansionary effects of fiscal contractions in the case of 
expenditure cuts, while the estimated effect is contractionary after using standard 
measures to correct for cyclical effects. Section 7 computes dynamic effects of fiscal 
policy based on both strategies to compute the CAPB. It is shown that there is a 
qualitative difference in the estimated multiplier if standard methods are used to 
compute the CAPB, rather than the method proposed by A&P. Section 8 concludes. 
 
                                                          
8
 In the following empirical part of the paper I use the same data and definitions as A&A (2010), 
precisely the OECD Economic Outlook, No. 84, as applied in A&A (2010) and in de Coz and Moral-
Benito (2013). As a standard cyclical adjustment strategy I obtain cyclically-adjusted data from the same 
source, based on the method proposed in Girouard and André (2005). 
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2. Cyclical adjustment and reverse causality 
 
2.1. Cyclical adjustment and the data-based approach 
 
To analyse the effects of changes in fiscal policy on GDP, the conventional (data-based) 
approach applies regressions of GDP growth rates ty  in year t on changes in the 
cyclically-adjusted primary budget balances (as a ratio to GDP) tcapb : 
 
(1)    ttt capby    
 
The idea of this approach is quite straightforward: coefficient   captures the effect of a 
change in fiscal policy (measured as a percentage point of GDP) on GDP growth rates, 
i.e, the fiscal multiplier. This approach provides unbiased estimates of the fiscal 
multiplier if tCAPB  is assumed to be uncorrelated to GDP growth. Since the cyclical 
adjustment strategy aims at controlling for the automatic feedback effects of GDP on 
the budget balance, the most obvious reason why the budget balance responds to GDP is 
controlled for. Because the c. a. budget balance is influenced by a number of factors 
(that might be correlated with the economic cycle – beyond automatic stabilizers), the 
question of reverse causation has often been discussed in the literature. Perotti (2013) 
distinguishes between two potential pitfalls of empirical papers on the effects of fiscal 
policy using the conventional approach, the “countercyclical response problem”, and the 
“imperfect cyclical adjustment problem”. 
While cyclical adjustment strategies usually aim at capturing the automatic response of 
the budget balance to a change in the economic cycle, the cyclically-adjusted budget 
balance can still be influenced by economic factors that are correlated with GDP growth 
but might not be captured by the cyclical adjustment strategy. For example, it is 
possible that counter-cyclical policy responses might contribute to the positive 
relationship between the budget balance and economic growth (“counter-cyclical 
response problem”). According to Perotti (2013), another potential pitfall might be the 
“incomplete cyclical adjustment problem”, e.g. that standard cyclical adjustment 
 7   
 
strategies do not account for changes in asset prices, while asset price fluctuations might 
be related to economic growth. In this context, a number of articles discuss the influence 
of asset prices on the budget.
9
 According to this, under the assumption of no “imperfect 
cyclical adjustment problem” due to asset price changes and no “counter-cyclical 
response problem”, it can be assumed that the estimated coefficient   is an unbiased 
assessment of the multiplier if the c.a. strategy correctly adjusts the budget balance for 
cyclical effects. 
 
2.2. The Blanchard method 
 
Typical cyclical adjustment strategies (as for instances applied in the OECD economic 
outlook) aims at controlling for automatic feedback from changes in the economic cycle 
to the budget balance: 
 
(2)     ttt uGapPBCAPB    
 
Here, Gap represents the output gap (as a percentage of potential GDP), where potential 
GDP is to be measured with a production function or filtering methods, what is a 
potential source of measurement error. Since a number of authors have been skeptical 
regarding the reliability of estimations of potential output and thus the output gap, 
Blanchard (1990) suggests estimations of potential GDP and the gap using the 
unemployment rate as a natural indicator of the economic cycle
10
: 
 
(3)     ttt uURPBCAPB    
 
A&P (1995) pioneered data-based analyses and the so-called “Blanchard method” to 
adjust the budget balance for cyclical effects. They refer to the so computed change in 
the fiscal stance as the “Blanchard fiscal impulse” (equation 3). 
                                                          
9
 See Morris and Schuknecht (2007) and Yang et al. (2015) on how asset price fluctuations might 
influence the budget balance and the estimated fiscal multiplier.  
10
 According to Blanchard (1990) an estimation of the level of potential GDP is not necessary anyway, 
since we are interested in changes in the fiscal policy rather than levels which might be estimated with the 
help of changes in the unemployment rate. 
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The basic question in this article is whether and how the cyclically adjustment strategy 
proposed in A&P is in line with the assumptions made in the literature on cyclical 
adjustment and whether there are potential pitfalls at the spending- or revenue side. 
Fedelino et al. (2009) is referred to as a benchmark study on cyclical adjustment, even 
though there are other pioneering discussions of cyclical adjustment strategies,  for 
example Girouard and André (2005). According to Fedelino et al. (2009), the CAB 
consists of cyclically-adjusted revenues net of cyclically-adjusted expenditure, both 
adjusted with their respective elasticities
11
:  
 
(4)     
GR
Y
Y
G
Y
Y
RCAPB
PP
t













  
 
One baseline assumption in the literature on cyclical adjustment, the following 
assumptions are made: unit-elastic revenues (responding to the tax base with an 
elasticity of 1), R  = 1, and inelastic government expenditure ( G  = 0). If so, equation 
(4) can be simplified: 
 
(5)     G
Y
Y
RCAPB
P
t 





  
 
To adjust the budget balance for cyclical effects, it appears to be reasonable to adjust 
revenues but not expenditure. However, since some expenditure items - as in the case of 
unemployment benefits - are affected by the economic cycles, the assumption of 
inelastic expenditure is critical. It is necessary to take into account elastic transfer 
payments (because unemployment benefits increase in an economic downturn). In this 
line, Alesina and Perotti (1995) assume that social transfers to households, as well as 
revenues (and only transfers and revenues) respond to cyclical effects. Accordingly, 
A&P apply the cyclical adjustment procedure to taxes and transfers, whereas 
expenditures other than transfers remain unadjusted. 
 
                                                          
11
 Note that the CAB in this illustration is not calculated as a ratio to GDP. 
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According to A&P
12
, it is necessary to adjust revenues with the unemployment rate 
rather than with estimations of potential output or the output gap. According to A&P 
and equivalent to equation (3), the BFI gives the following: 
 
(6)    GURTrURRCAPB tTrttRt  )(   
 
Rather than computing estimates of potential GDP and output elasticities, here it is only 
necessary to compute estimates of the elasticities of transfers and tax revenues with 
respect to GDP ( R  and Tr ). 
To do so, for each country, A&P regresses social transfers as a share of GDP
13
 on two 
time trends (one for the full period and one for the period after 1975 to control for a 
potential structural break)
14
 and on the unemployment rate: 
 
(7)    ttt eURbtrendatrendaaTr  752110  
 
Thus, A&P estimates what the transfers would be in period t if unemployment rates 
were the same as in the previous year: 
 
(8)   tttt eURbtrendatrendaaURTr



  17521101)(  
 
Here 0

a , 1

a , 2

a , and 

b  represent estimated coefficients (and 

e  is the residual) of 
equation (7). The difference between unemployment-adjusted transfers )( 1tt URTr  
according to equation (8) and previous’ years’ transfers 1tTr  is seen as a measure of the 
change in cyclically-adjusted transfers (equivalent to equation 6). 
 
(9)     ttt URbTrCATr 

 
                                                          
12
 This definition remains relatively similar to the follow up papers, as e. g. in A&A (1998, 2010, 2013). 
13
 Note that in the definition of the Blanchard method in A&P the fiscal variables are expressed as ratios 
to GDP. 
14
 In more recent studies, the second trend is neglected (see A&A, 2010 and 2013).  
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The estimated elasticity of transfers with respect to unemployment  

b  is similar to 
coefficient Tr  in equation (6). The same procedure is applied for revenues to achieve 
unemployment-adjusted revenues ( )( 1tt URR  ). With the construction of  )( 1tt URTr  and 
)( 1tt URR , A&P estimates the primary deficit that would have prevailed in period t if 
unemployment were to be the same rate as in year t-1. According to equation (6), the 
BFI (changes in cyclically-adjusted primary balance) is the difference between the 
unemployment adjusted measure of the primary balance and the previous year’s primary 
balance. 
 
2.3. Scaling and the incomplete cyclical adjustment problem 
 
The definition of the BFI, as defined above, however, is in conflict with standard 
methods to compute cyclically-adjusted budget balances, for example, the OECD 
approach (Girouard, André, 2005) or as described in Fedelino et al. (2009). The reason 
for this is that the Blanchard method - according to A&P - does not adjust only revenue 
and expenditure, but revenue and expenditure as a ratio of GDP. To use the variables in 
data-based analyses (as explained above), it is helpful to scale the variables and express 
the CAPB as a ratio of potential GDP (as a natural reference series). In doing so, 
following Fedelino et al. (2009), equation (4) and (5) will have to be modified into: 
 
(10)
)1()1(
11
)1()1(




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

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




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t
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Note that gap here represents the output gap as a ratio of potential GDP. 
Again, assuming unit-elastic revenues R  = 1 and inelastic government expenditure G  
= 0, equation (10) can be simplified: 
 
(11)     )1( gap
Y
G
Y
R
capbt   
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The result is different from the CAPB without scaling in equation (5). Using revenues 
and expenditures as a ratio of GDP, standard assumptions would suggest adjusting 
expenditure (as a ratio of GDP), rather than revenue (as a ratio of GDP).
15
 It will  not be 
reasonable to adjust revenues if the variables are expressed as ratios of GDP, since (if 
the elasticity will be one) revenues are expected  to have the same growth rates as GDP. 
After scaling however, there is need to adjust expenditures. 
 
2.4. Incomplete cyclical adjustment and reverse causality 
 
Using equation (10) and (1) to measure the effect of fiscal policy on growth gives: 
 
(12)  tt
t
t
t
t
t
t ugap
Y
G
gap
Y
R
Y GR 





  )1()1( )1()1(   
 
If R  = 1 and G  = 0 
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t
t
t
t
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Y 
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





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Accordingly, government expenditure as a ratio of GDP needs to be corrected for 
cyclical effects, however, following A&P and correcting only taxes and transfers as a 
ratio of GDP, the estimated CAPB (as a ratio of GDP) includes cyclical effects (in the 
denominator) and consists of (adjusted) revenues as a ratio of GDP, ( tCAR ), net of 
(adjusted) transfers as a ratio of GDP ( tCATr ), net of the ratio of (unadjusted) 
government expenditure (other than transfers) to GDP ( tE / tY ): 
 
(14)   
t
t
t
ttt u
Y
E
CATrCARY 







   
                                                          
15
 In this line A&P note that using the primary deficit as a share of GDP “is not a bad approximation as 
long as expenditures and revenues are close to being unit elastic to GDP”. Indeed, following their 
methodology, implicitly they assume expenditure to be unit-elastic, what is in conflict with standard 
assumptions on cyclical adjustment, in the case of expenditures.  
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Under the assumption that government spending (other than transfers) does not respond 
to cyclical effects, by approximation, the expenditure-to-GDP ratio behaves inversely 
proportional to the output gap:  
 
(15)    tttttt uGapeCATrCARY  )1(  
 
Where te  is the structural ratio of expenditure (other than transfers) to potential output. 
It is now obvious that the ratio of government expenditure other than transfers can be 
influenced by two separate factors, discretionary policy changes that influence the 
structural expenditure ratio ( te ) and cyclical effects ( tGap ). Assuming no policy 
changes ( CAR =0, CATr =0, as well as e =0), and under the assumption that output 
growth is a sum of (constant) potential output growth c and changes in the output gap (
tGapcY  ), equation (15) can be simplified to:  
 
(16)   tttt uGapeGapc    
 
It is now obvious that an increase in the output gap ( Gap ) influences both sides of 
equation (16), even without any discretionary policy change. The BFI, however, might 
interpret an economic upswing (increase in the output gap) as a discretionary reduction 
in government spending.  
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3. Hypotheses  
 
This section explores how erroneous assumptions on the elasticities R  and G  would 
influence estimates of parameter   in data-based analyses on fiscal policy. Basically, 
ignoring other critique (countercyclical response problem and changes in asset prices), 
regressions of equation (12) provide unbiased estimates of parameter   if the 
elasticities R  and G  are estimated correctly. If the method applied however does not 
correctly adjust for cyclical effects, Table 1 shows how this would affect the correlation 
of the CAPB-ratio to the output gap, and the consequences for the estimated multiplier 
in conventional analyses of fiscal policy (equation 12). 
To summarize, following the standard assumptions, that R  = 1 and G =0 or G < 0
16
, a 
flawed estimate of the fiscal multiplier is particularly pronounced in the case of 
expenditures. However, if R > 1, an imperfect cyclical adjustment problem will not 
only decrease the estimated multiplier in the case of government expenditure but also 
decrease the estimated multiplier in the case of taxes. In this case, the consequence of 
finding evidence for expansionary austerity will be particularly likely. 
From the above analysis, the following testable hypotheses are obtained: 
 
1.) The BFI is correlated with changes in the output gap, while other fiscal 
indicators based on standard assumptions are not (or less) correlated. 
2.) This correlation is particularly pronounced in the case of changes in expenditure 
(per GDP) and less pronounced in the case of changes in revenue (per GDP). 
3.) The resulting estimated fiscal multiplier (using equation 1) is small (or even 
negative) if the BFI is used as fiscal impulse, compared to results based on 
standard assumptions on automatic stabilization (the CAPB as used in the 
OECD Economic Outlook based on Girouard and André, 2005). 
4.) Differences in estimations of the fiscal multiplier are particularly pronounced in 
the case of changes in expenditures (per GDP) and less pronounced in the case 
of changes in revenues (per GDP). 
                                                          
16
 Refer to Girouard and Andre (2005). 
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4. Endogeneity of fiscal indicators  
 
This section analyzes the cyclical behavior of the BFI (as estimated by A&A, 2010) and 
compares it to the behavior of the CAPB, as calculated by the OECD. Since section 2 
has shown that the BFI suffers from imperfect cyclical adjustment, hypothesis (1) shows 
that the BFI entails a (positive) cyclical pattern. Figure 1 a) compares changes in the 
CAPB (estimated according to A&P), and b) according to the definitions of the OECD 
against changes in the output gap, since an imperfect c.a. problem will  result in a 
cyclical behavior of ΔCAPB.17 
Figure 1 (c and d) depicts the cyclical behavior of cyclically adjusted government 
revenues (adjusted with the A&P method and the OECD method), and Figure 1 (e and 
f) shows the comparable behavior of expenditures. Figure 1 a) and 1 e) shows that the 
fiscal indicators measured according to A&P are biased if there is no adjustment  for 
cyclical effects (hypothesis 1). While this pattern seem not to be pronounced for 
revenues (1 c), it is particularly pronounced in the case of government expenditure 
(hypothesis 2). 
We quantitatively explore the cyclical pattern of the fiscal indicators ΔFit in our panel 
dataset (with country i and year t) with regressions of the following form
18
  
 
(17)    ΔFit = µi + λt +𝛾 ΔGapit + uit 
 
Table 2 shows the estimated coefficients 𝛾. For comparison, Table 2 includes the 
unadjusted primary balance as another reference. As expected, it is shown that the 
unadjusted primary balance entails a cyclical pattern (imperfect cyclical adjustment). 
This pattern seems to be lower but persistent in the A&P measure, while the CAPB 
from the OECD appears to be uncorrelated to changes in the economic cycle. Looking 
at government revenue, the unadjusted revenues are negatively correlated to the output 
                                                          
17
 The data used in this paper is from the same source as used in A&A (2010), obtained from the OECD 
Economic Outlook no. 84. The c.a. procedure of the OECD is described in Girouard and André (2005). 
18
 Guajardo et al. (2014) analyze fiscal cyclicality in a comparable framework to show that the CAPB (as 
used in A&A) obtain a cyclical pattern, while the narrative measure of fiscal activity does not. Different 
from Guajardo et al. (2014) I do not use narrative measures of fiscal policy as a reference, but CAPB 
based on standard definitions, as provided by the OECD, and use the change in the output gap as cyclical 
indicator rather than GDP growth rate revisions. 
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gap, pointing to a short-run elasticity of < 0. However, after cyclical adjustment the 
cyclicality of revenues disappears, both in the BFI- as well as in the OECD-measure. 
However, as proposed by hypothesis 2, the indicators of government expenditures (as a 
ratio of GDP) are negatively associated with the economic cycle, which is strongly 
pronounced in the case of unadjusted indicators. Adjusting the expenditure ratio with 
the Blanchard-method, this counter-cyclical pattern remains at a slightly lower level. 
Thus, the Blanchard method does not sufficiently control for cyclical effects in 
government expenditure, as suspected in equation (15).
19
 
 
5. Large recessions and expansions 
A&A (2010) identify episodes of large changes in fiscal policy. According to their 
definition, an episode of a large fiscal stimulus is an episode when the BFI (primary 
deficit, c.a. with the Blanchard method) increases by more than 1.5 pp. of GDP in the 
same year, while an episode of a large fiscal adjustment is an episode when the BFI 
(primary deficit, c.a. with the Blanchard method) decreases by more than 1.5 pp. of 
GDP. Following the hypotheses above, it is conceivable that the selection of these 
episodes is endogenous to economic growth. In particular, the identification as an 
episode of large fiscal stimulus will be influenced by negative changes in the output 
gap, while positive changes in the output gap will increase the likelihood of identifying 
this episode as a large fiscal consolidation. 
Table 3 shows the 40 largest cases of economic recessions (negative changes in the 
output gap) in OECD history (in the dataset of A&A, 2010). While this selection 
focuses on episodes during the oil price crises of 1975 and 1981, some of these episodes 
are selected as large episodes of fiscal expansion, according to A&A (2010). To test 
whether this selection is based on the cyclical adjustment strategy of A&P, the BFI in 
these episodes is compared with the CAPB (c.a. with OECD method) and it was 
discovered that the CAPB, as estimated with the OECD method, also identifies a few 
large recessions as episodes of discretionary fiscal stimulus, however several of the 
episodes identified by A&A (2010) are not large expansionary episodes if the CAPB is 
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 The results are very much in line if we use GDP growth as alternative cyclical indicator, rather than the 
output gap. 
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used. For instance, Canada in 1982 and 1991, as well as Belgium and France in 1975 
did not increase the CAPB by more than 1.5. percent; while A&A (2010) treat these 
years as episodes of large fiscal expansions because the BFI increases by more than 1.5 
percent. This selection points to the two problems highlighted by Perotti (2013), the 
countercyclical response problem (a), as well as the incomplete cyclical adjustment 
problem (b). 
First, the countercyclical response problem appears if fiscal policy behaves 
countercyclical and increases deficits as a consequence of an economic recession. Table 
3 depicts that this problem appears in both cases, whether we rely on the BFI or the 
CAPB. Governments tend to increase the CAPB in periods of economic slack as a 
countercyclical policy response, whether the cyclical adjustment strategy is the 
Blanchard method or the OECD method. This countercyclical response problem might 
be one reason for the critique of the data-based approach. However, the CAPB (OECD 
method) selects substantially fewer recessions as episodes of fiscal stimuli, compared to 
the BFI. This, secondly, points to an incomplete cyclical adjustment problem (b) for the 
BFI (hypothesis 1). Since this article focuses on the question of how to correct for 
cyclical effects and whether an incomplete cyclical adjustment influences the results of 
the fiscal multiplier, there is no elaboration on the countercyclical response problem in 
more detail, rather focus is on the incomplete cyclical adjustment problem. 
While the BFI selects 15 of the 40 largest recessions as episodes of fiscal stimulus, the 
CAPB only selects 9. It is thus more likely that the BFI interprets an economic 
downturn as an episode of fiscal expansionism. The imperfect cyclical adjustment 
problem (b) in the BFI thus might multiply the countercyclical response problem (a). 
Table 4 shows a similar picture for the case of economic upturns and fiscal 
consolidations. The results are less striking as in the case of fiscal stimuli in times of 
recessions. While the BFI selects 9 of the 40 largest economic upturns as episodes of 
fiscal consolidation, the CAPB only selects 4. For instance, United Kingdom in 1988 
and New Zealand in 1993 and 1994 shows up as a case of large fiscal consolidation, 
while the CAPB-based approach does not show an increase in the CAPB of more than 
1.5 percentage points. It seems that the countercyclical response problem is less 
distinctive in the case of responding to economic upturns, however, the number of cases 
in which the BFI selects a large episode of economic expansion as period of fiscal 
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consolidation significantly increases (more than doubled), so that the effect of the 
imperfect cyclical adjustment (in A&P) should not be underrated. Figure 4 shows the 
correlation between changes in the economic cycle (output gap) and the CAPB (based 
on the Blanchard method) in the 40 largest episodes of economic upswings and 
downturns. It shows a clear negative relationship, suggesting that the BFI-based CAPB 
tends to be clearly more expansionary in economic recessions, compared to the large 
episodes of economic upswings (when the BFI-based CAPB seems to be more 
contractionary). From this picture, it is reasonable to assume a positive correlation 
between fiscal adjustments and GDP (either through a countercyclical response problem 
or expansionary austerity). 
Figure 5 depicts the same variables, but now the CAPB is calculated with standard 
assumptions on cyclical adjustment by the OECD. The clear negative relationship 
decreases substantially. While the positive relationship is particularly pronounced in the 
case of economic downturns, it is less significant in the case of economic upswings, 
pointing to a small remaining countercyclical response problem in times of recessions 
(probably as a reaction to the oil price crises in 1975 and 1981), while there is little 
support for a large countercyclical response problem in the case of upswing episodes. 
In summary, the CAPB based on the BFI appears to be highly correlated with changes 
in the economic cycle, while the CAPB based on conventional methods is not. This 
suggests that the BFI as proposed by A&P and applied by A&A (2010) suffers from an 
incomplete cyclical adjustment problem, as suggested by hypothesis (1). It is shown that 
the incomplete cyclical adjustment problem increases the likelihood of selecting an 
economic recession as a fiscal expansion and an economic upswing as an episode of 
fiscal consolidation. 
 
6. Replication and sensitivity analysis 
This section reproduces the evidence shown in A&A (2010) based on the BFI and 
shows the sensitivity of the results if CAPB is used as a fiscal indicator, cyclically-
adjusted with standard methods as used by the OECD, rather than the BFI. 
As discussed in the previous section, A&A (2010) examines episodes of large changes 
in the fiscal stance, if the BFI/CAPB increases/decreases by more than 1.5 percentage 
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points. The selected episodes by this definition, for the BFI as well as the CAPB, are 
shown in the appendix.
20
 Table 5 and 6 shows the results of a replication of A&A 
(2010), both with the BFI and the CAPB.
21
 A&A (2010) analyzes whether changes in 
the BFI have an effect on GDP in episodes of large changes in the fiscal stance with 
regressions of the following form: 
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where only cases of either large fiscal expansions or large fiscal consolidations are 
taken into account. Table 5 shows the results for the analysis of large episodes of fiscal 
expansions. While column (1) and (2) are perfect replications of the results in A&A, 
column (3) and (4) show the same results, with the only difference that the CAPB is 
used as provided by the OECD (from the OECD Economic outlook no. 84, as in A&A, 
2010), rather than calculated with the Blanchard method. While the BFI selects 72 
episodes, the number of episodes selected by the CAPB (OECD) decreases substantially 
(65). It is shown that the positive effect of fiscal consolidations decreases after using the 
CAPB of the OECD, however, the effect is not statistically significant in both 
regressions (column 1 and 3). Column (2) and (4) distinguish between the effect of 
current expenditure investment and revenue. The results based on the BFI and presented 
in A&A show a clear negative relationship between expenditure and growth in episodes 
of fiscal stimuli. This relationship has been widely interpreted as evidence for a negative 
multiplier in the case of expenditure cuts (A&A, 2010). However, using the OECD 
measure of the CAPB, the result decreases substantially and loses statistical significance 
(column 4). 
Table 6 illustrates the results for fiscal adjustments. As in the case of fiscal stimuli 
(Table 5), the number of observations decreases from 88 to 76, after using the CAPB 
(by the OECD). Similar to the evidence in Table 5, the effect of fiscal consolidation 
based on the BFI is positive in column 1, suggesting evidence for expansionary 
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 Note that the selected episodes selected in the case of the BFI are similar to the episodes examined in 
A&A (2010).  
21
 Since the data is the same data as used by A&A, the results for the Blanchard method are perfect 
replications of the results in A&A. 
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austerity, however, the result is not statistically significant. The results based on the 
CAPB (OECD), however, shows that fiscal consolidations appear to be negatively 
associated with GDP growth, suggesting a typical Keynesian effect, even though the 
effect is not statistically significant (column 3). Column 2 and 4 distinguish between the 
effects of expenditure- and revenue- based fiscal consolidations. It turns out that the 
effect of revenues increases slightly, while the effect of expenditure cuts do not change 
substantially, however, the positive effect of expenditure cuts on GDP loses statistical 
significance if the cyclical adjustment is based on the OECD method. Comparing the 
results based on the BFI-based with the results based on the OECD-based CAPB in 
Tables 5 and 6, the results based on the BFI provide evidence for non-Keynesian 
effects, while the results based on the CAPB (hypothesis 3) do not support this view. 
Further, the negative multiplier for results based on the BFI seems to be more 
pronounced in the case of expenditure cuts, compared to increases in revenues 
(hypothesis 4). However, as discussed in section 4, there might be a countercyclical 
response problem. Further, the evidence presented in Tables 5 and 6 is based on a 
limited number of observations so that it might be interesting to additionally analyze 
and compare the evidence based on the full sample and not rely only on the selective 
evidence for cases of large changes in fiscal policy. 
Table 7 replicates and compares another result of A&A (2010), that fiscal 
consolidations are positively associated with GDP, if the sample is not restricted to 
large episodes of discretionary change. Regressions of the following form are estimated: 
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Here the sample is not restricted to large cases of fiscal stimuli and adjustments, and 
includes country- and time fixed effects. Again, columns (1) and (2) present the 
replication of the A&A results, while columns (3) and (4) show the results based on the 
CAPB (OECD). Comparing columns (1) and (3), the statistically significant positive 
effect of fiscal consolidation on GDP disappears after appropriately controlling for 
cyclical effects. Further, the negative multiplier for expenditures (column 2) decreases 
substantially if CAPB based measure rather than the BFI (column 4) is used. This latter 
finding is consistent with our hypothesis (4).  
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7. Dynamic responses 
 
Section 4 has shown that both the BFI-based as well as the CAPB-based analysis might 
be influenced by a countercyclical response problem in episodes of large recessions, due 
to countercyclical policy in times of crisis. It will thus be interesting, whether the results 
hold after excluding large episodes of fiscal expansions and analyze and compare 
episodes of large increases in the CAPB, based on both methods. To show that the 
estimated effect of fiscal adjustments on GDP is influenced by the strategy of how to 
adjust for cyclical effects, the method proposed by Leigh et al. (2010) and used in 
Alesina and Ardagna (2013) is applied:  
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Again, ity represents real GDP growth in country i at time t and 
FA
itcab  denotes the 
estimated change in the cyclically adjusted primary balance (as a percentage of GDP) in 
periods of large fiscal adjustments ( kitcab   > 1.5 p.p. of GDP) and zero otherwise.
22
 I 
distinguish between two strategies to adjust for cyclical effects, the BFI method as 
proposed by Alesina and Perotti (1995), and the conventional (OECD) method, as 
proposed by Girouard and André (2005).
23
 i  and t  represent cross-section and time 
fixed effects, respectively.  
Table 1 shows the results of this augmented specification. Since A&A (2010) did not 
compute dynamic responses of fiscal policy, this table is not a replication of A&A 
(2010), however, since the sample and data is similar to their study it might be a 
comparable analysis to A&A (2013) which computed dynamic responses of changes in 
fiscal policy based on the BFI in a similar framework. 
                                                          
22
 In an augmented specification I include changes in cyclically-adjusted current revenues and changes in 
cyclically-adjusted current primary spending in periods of large fiscal adjustments, rather than changes in 
the CAB during the same year. 
23
 The data and sample in this study again is the same as in A&A (2010), while the results for the OECD-
measure use data based on the OECD Economic Outlook No. 84 (same source as used in A&A, 2010). 
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Column (1) shows that there is a positive association between fiscal adjustments and 
GDP growth, however, the result is not statistically significant. This non-Keynesian 
effect changes its sign in column (3), after using the c.a. strategy of the OECD however 
the result is not statistically significant at conventional levels. Furthermore, column (2) 
shows a strong non-Keynesian effect of expenditure cuts on GDP if the BFI is used, but 
the result turns opposite after using the OECD measure. This clearly supports 
hypothesis 3 and 4 which states that the BFI-based results are biased towards 
expansionary effects and that this bias is particularly pronounced for expenditure cuts. 
Column (4) additionally suggests that the (negative) effects of BFI-based measures are 
underestimated in the case of revenue-based consolidations, however, the effect changes 
after a lag of one year. Dynamic response functions are computed with the delta method 
to show whether the estimated dynamic response of GDP to a one-percentage point 
fiscal consolidation varies with the measure of fiscal policy. 
Figure 6 depicts the results of equation (20), where there is a distinguishment between 
the estimated effect of large changes in the CAPB as calculated by the method proposed 
by A&P (1995) and large changes in the CAPB as provided by the OECD. A 
comparison of the results show that the estimated contractionary effect of fiscal 
adjustments based on the CAPB (OECD approach) is more pronounced, as compared to 
the results based on the A&P approach. While the response of the BFI-based 
consolidation shows some evidence for potential expansionary effects of fiscal 
adjustment, the results based on the CAPB (OECD approach) are relatively 
contractionary, in line with hypothesis (3). 
Figure 7 shows the estimated effect of a one percent point increase in current revenues. 
In line with hypothesis 4, the estimated effects of both approaches are relatively similar 
and contractionary, what is not surprising, given that the elasticity of revenues is usually 
assumed to be approximately one, so that the revenue-GDP-ratio does not necessarily 
need to be adjusted for automatic cyclical effects. 
Figure 8 shows the same results for expenditure-cuts. The estimated effect of a one 
percent point reduction in primary expenditures is very different in both approaches, 
depending on the method applied to adjust the data for cyclical effects. The A&P 
approach finds expansionary effects of fiscal adjustments at the spending side. The 
(negative) impact multiplier is estimated to be -0.3 and turns out to be -0.4 after two 
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years.
24
 If the data provided by the OECD is used, the result is the opposite. The impact 
multiplier is 0.1 (positive), suggesting that a reduction in government spending has a 
negative impact on GDP if adjustment is made for cyclical effects with the OECD-
method. This observation is in line with hypothesis (4), where a negative correlation is 
expected between GDP growth and the expenditure-GDP ratio, if we fail to correct for 
cyclical effects in the expenditure-GDP ratio.
25
 
Since the data-based approach has been criticized for not controlling for one-off 
operations, as another strategy to improve the data-based approach, an alternative 
CAPB of the OECD which excludes one-off operations, the so-called underlying 
balance, was used.
26
 As a test for robustness, all regressions are estimated using this 
indicator alternatively. After using the underlying balance and controlling for the noise 
through one-off operations in the budget balance, a large share of the results turn out to 
be more pronounced and statistically significant, compared to the CAPB-based ones. 
Nevertheless, since the intention of this paper is the illustration of the incomplete 
cyclical adjustment problem in the literature following the method proposed by A&P 
(1995), at this point there is no extensive discussion on the advantages and 
disadvantages of using this alternative indicator. Nevertheless, as a test for robustness 
the dynamic response of GDP to large fiscal contractions (computed with the 
underlying balance rather than the CAPB) is shown in the appendix of this paper.  
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 These results are very much in line with the results in Alesina and Ardagna (2013), who found that a 
one percent point reduction in government spending increases GDP by 0.15 percent in the same year and 
by 0.46 percent after two years. 
25
 Alesina and Ardagna (2011) state that their results are not affected by the method applied to adjust for 
cyclical effects, and that the results remain robust, even without controlling for cyclical effects. Indeed, 
the estimated effects of fiscal consolidations based on the AAP approach are almost identical to those 
estimated with unadjusted data. To address this question, I compute the results based on unadjusted data, 
compared to the results based on the CAPB. The results based on this measure are shown in the appendix. 
26
 Refer to Joumard et al. (2008) for a discussion on how one-off operations influence the budget balance 
and the definition of the underlying primary balance. 
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8. Conclusion 
 
A large share of empirical literature on fiscal policy pioneered by Alesina and Perotti 
(1995) examines changes in cyclically-adjusted budget balances (CAPB) and finds a 
positive relationship between CAPB (computed with the A&P-method) and GDP (non-
Keynesian effects or expansionary austerity). This counter-intuitive relationship has 
been found to be particularly pronounced in the case of government spending (wage- 
and non-wage consumption expenditure). This stream of literature highlights that 
adjustments at the spending side are likely to be successful (in reducing government 
debt) or expansionary, while this is not the case for revenue-based consolidations 
(A&A, 1998, 2010 and 2013). 
A number of authors have criticized these findings and pointed to potential conflicts 
with endogeneity. For instance, Jayadev and Konczal (2010) and De Cos and Moral-
Benito (2013) found that the evidence on expansionary austerity in A&A (2010) is 
mainly based on successful adjustments in an economic upswing. 
Guajardo et al. (2014) contrasted the data-based evidence in A&A (2010) with new 
evidence based on narrative measures of fiscal consolidations. They show that the data-
based fiscal consolidations are not exogenous to economic growth. 
Nevertheless, the discussion so far has not identified why the CAPB as proposed by 
A&P is endogenous to growth. Some studies highlight the presence of a countercyclical 
response problem (de Coz and Moral-Benito, 2013, and Guajardo et al., 2014), while 
others discuss the failure of the BFI to address the fiscal effects of changes in asset 
prices (Guajardo et al., 2014 and Yang et al., 2015). However, both hypotheses do not 
explain why the CAPB computed with standard methods is not (or less) endogenous to 
growth, a finding that is shown in this paper. The reverse causality argument can be 
seen as an answer to this puzzle. 
The reverse causality argument proposed in this article focuses on the incomplete 
cyclical adjustment problem in the approach of A&P (1995) to adjust for cyclical effects 
in budgetary data with the help of the “Blanchard method” or the Blanchard fiscal 
impulse (BFI), which is relevant in a large number of subsequent studies based on the 
same approach, as for instance A&A (1998, 2010 and 2013), as well as Ardagna (2002 
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and 2009). It is shown that the cyclical adjustment strategy pioneered by A&P (1995) 
and used in a number of following studies is prone to an imperfect cyclical adjustment 
problem (following the definition of Perotti, 2013). 
The critique of the A&P approach proposed in this paper is that A&P implicitly assume 
an elasticity of government expenditure (other than transfers) with respect to GDP of 
one (or close to one). Conversely, standard cyclical adjustment procedures assume an 
elasticity of zero for expenditures other than transfers (Girouard and André, 2005). The 
theoretical discussion in this paper shows that this imperfect cyclical adjustment 
problem influences the estimated multiplier in conventional (data-based) analyses of 
fiscal policy so that the results are endogenously biased towards expansionary austerity. 
This paper highlights that this result is affected by reverse causality, i.e. increasing GDP 
decreases expenditure-GDP-ratios, if the method applied fails to adjust for cyclical 
effects. It is shown theoretically and empirically that the cyclical adjustment strategy 
proposed by A&P does not appropriately control for cyclical effects. 
The empirical discussion in this paper examines the data used in one of the prominent 
studies in the literature on expansionary austerity, A&A (2010), which is based on the 
method proposed by A&P. Further, the data and results of A&A (2010) are contrasted 
with cyclically-adjusted data, as provided by the OECD and respective results. 
It is shown that the CAPB based on the A&P method is positively correlated with 
changes in the economic cycle, while the CAPB based on conventional methods is not.  
Investigating large changes in the output gap, it is shown that the strategy proposed by 
A&P increases the likelihood that a large episode of economic downturn is selected as 
an episode of a large fiscal stimulus by the method applied in A&A (2010), so that a 
large share of cases of fiscal stimuli as examined by A&A (2010) are affected by 
cyclical increases in deficits, rather than structural stimuli. In this line, the cyclical 
adjustment strategy proposed by A&P increases the likelihood that an episode of large 
economic upswing is selected as an episode of fiscal consolidation, since the cyclically 
adjustment procedure fails to disentangle the endogenous cyclical increase in the budget 
balance and the exogenous discretionary change in the fiscal stance. The imperfect 
cyclical adjustment problem particularly affects the expenditure-GDP-ratio, so that an 
increase in GDP is associated with decreases in the expenditure-GDP-ratio, while the 
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(non-) adjustment of revenues in the approach of A&P does not affect the results in a 
systematic pattern. 
Replicating the results presented in A&A (2010), and comparing the results based on 
the Blanchard-method with the results based on an alternative CAPB-based measure 
(where the CAPB is cyclically-adjusted with standard assumptions based on the method 
proposed by Girouard and André, 2005), it is shown that the expansionary effect of 
fiscal consolidations disappears after controlling for cyclical effects with the help of 
standard methods, rather than the method proposed by A&P. 
The reverse causality argument proposed in this paper might contribute to systemizing a 
number of controversies in the recent literature. For example, it explains why the 
evidence on expansionary austerity is particularly based on cases where output operates 
above potential (Jayadev and Konczal, 2010; Jordà and Taylor, 2015; de Cos and 
Moral-Benito, 2013). It also explains why the literature based on the A&P approach 
suggests that cuts in government expenditure are associated with macroeconomic 
expansions, while increasing revenues (as a ratio to GDP) are contractive. While the 
latter finding is in line with the theoretical literature, the finding of expansionary effects 
in case of expenditure cuts has been seen as a counter-intuitive finding and has been 
frequently cited. It is shown that this finding reflects cyclical increases in the budget 
resulting from economic upswing, rather than an economic upswing resulting from a 
discretionary cut in government expenditures. 
This article might also contribute to the literature in a more general way. A number of 
contributions have been critical regarding data-based analyses of fiscal policy in the 
recent past (Guajardo et al, 2014). However, in this article it is shown that it is not the 
data-based approach in general, rather than a specific method of how to adjust the 
budget for cyclical effects, which biases the results. In line with Yang et al. (2015), this 
article shows that the data-based approach is applicable if the cyclical position of the 
budget is correctly taken into account. If the incomplete cyclical adjustment problem is 
addressed, for example, by using the CAPB as published by the OECD, it would thus be 
possible to improve the data-based approach.  
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Table 1: Consequences of imperfect cyclical adjustment under different 
assumptions on revenue- and spending elasticities 
 
If Relation to gap Effect on the estimated multiplier 
R >1 R/Y (+) Underestimation of the (negative) revenue multiplier 
R <1 R/Y (-) Overestimation of the (negative) revenue multiplier 
G >1 G/Y (+) Overestimation of the (positive) expenditure multiplier 
G <1 G/Y (-) Underestimation of the (positive) expenditure multiplier 
 
 
Table 2: Fiscal policy and changes in the output gap 
 
Equation estimated: ΔFit = µi + λt + 𝛾ΔGapit + ɛit 
Measure of ΔF β s.e. R-squared Obs 
     
ΔPB 0.350*** 0.061 0.298 669 
ΔCAPB(AA) 0.188*** 0.059 0.228 668 
ΔCAPB(OECD) 0.019 0.052 0.160 653 
     
Current revenues β s.e. R-squared Obs 
     
ΔR -0.107* 0.060 0.179 669 
ΔCAR(AA) -0.063 0.046 0.122 668 
ΔCAR(OECD) -0.006 0.055 0.168 653 
     
Current expenditures β s.e. R-squared Obs 
     
ΔE -0.441*** 0.064 0.567 669 
ΔCAE(AA) -0.222*** 0.047 0.331 668 
ΔCAE(OECD) 0.005 0.050 0.333 669 
     
Notes: The table reports point estimates and heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors. All specifications 
contain full set of country and time fixed effects (not reported in the table). 
*** Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. 
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Figure 1: Indicators of fiscal policy (A&P and OECD) vs. output gap 
 
a) CAPB, A&P b) CAPB, OECD 
 
c) Revenues, A&P d) Revenues, OECD 
 
e) Expenditure, A&P f) Expenditure, OECD 
 
Source: Alesina and Ardagna (2010), OECD Economic Outlook No. 84. 
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Figure 2: ∆CAPB (A&P) vs. ∆Gap in largest episodes of up- and downswing 
 
 
 
 
Source: A&A (2010), OECD Economic Outlook, No. 84, own calculations. 
 
Figure 3: ∆CAPB (OECD) vs. ∆Gap in largest episodes of up- and downswing 
 
 
 
 
Source: OECD Economic Outlook, No. 84, own calculations. 
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Table 3: Fiscal Stimulus and Growth 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Blanchard method 
Replication of A&A 
CAPB-based (OECD) 
   
GDP growth (t-1) 0.468*** 0.484*** 0.528*** 0.540*** 
 (0.147) (0.133) (0.165) (0.164) 
GDP growth (t-2) -0.162 -0.081 -0.219 -0.225 
 (0.139) (0.134) (0.149) (0.154) 
G7 growth (t-1) 0.364* 0.272 0.308 0.303 
 (0.202) (0.185) (0.232) (0.234) 
Debt (t-1) -0.004 -0.007 -0.008 -0.014 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.011) (0.012) 
Expenditure  -0.751***  -0.214 
  (0.262)  (0.366) 
Investment  -0.255  0.331 
  (0.185)  (0.642) 
Revenues  -0.177  -0.364 
  (0.285)  (0.318) 
Consolidation 0.283  0.113  
 (0.187)  (0.228)  
Constant 0.008 0.012 0.012 0.012 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.012) (0.012) 
     
Observations 72 72 65 65 
R-squared 0.282 0.428 0.285 0.330 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Source: A&A (2010), OECD Economic Outlook No. 84, own calculations. 
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Table 4: Fiscal Adjustments and Growth 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLE Blanchard method 
Replication of A&A 
CAPB-based (OECD) 
     
GDP growth (t-1) 0.296*** 0.288*** -0.004 0.008 
 (0.099) (0.092) (0.137) (0.130) 
GDP growth (t-2) -0.001 0.082 0.069 0.042 
 (0.088) (0.084) (0.115) (0.109) 
G7 growth (t-1) 0.116 0.038 0.210 -0.128 
 (0.151) (0.142) (0.204) (0.221) 
Debt (t-1) -0.011* -0.007 -0.012* -0.016** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) 
Expenditure  -0.434**  -0.441 
  (0.170)  (0.267) 
Investment  0.082  -0.534 
  (0.136)  (0.335) 
Revenues  -0.216  -0.369 
  (0.199)  (0.229) 
Consolidation 0.044  -0.081  
 (0.134)  (0.173)  
Constant 0.026*** 0.024*** 0.030*** 0.041*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) 
     
Observations 88 88 76 76 
R-squared 0.218 0.348 0.073 0.198 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Source: A&A (2010), OECD Economic Outlook No. 84, own calculations. 
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Table 5: Fiscal Policy and GDP Growth 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Blanchard method 
Replication of A&A 
CAPB-based (OECD) 
     
GDP growth (t-1) 0.352*** 0.367*** 0.351*** 0.345*** 
 (0.042) (0.040) (0.043) (0.043) 
GDP growth (t-2) -0.038 0.016 -0.045 -0.039 
 (0.042) (0.040) (0.043) (0.043) 
Debt (t-1) -0.004 -0.005 -0.003 -0.003 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Expenditure  -0.508***  -0.176** 
  (0.061)  (0.082) 
Investment  -0.070  -0.086 
  (0.060)  (0.168) 
Revenue  -0.121**  -0.094 
  (0.061)  (0.066) 
Consolidation 0.154***  0.028  
 (0.039)  (0.042)  
     
Observations 569 569 566 566 
R-squared 0.500 0.562 0.482 0.491 
Countries 21 21 21 21 
R-squared within 0.500 0.562 0.482 0.491 
R-squared between 0.872 0.802 0.886 0.846 
R-squared overall 0.504 0.571 0.488 0.500 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Source: A&A (2010), OECD Economic Outlook No. 84, own calculations. 
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Table 6: Dynamic response of GDP to fiscal consolidation 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Blanchard method CAPB-based (OECD) 
     
GDP growth (t-1) 0.319*** 0.325*** 0.391*** 0.394*** 
 (0.040) (0.040) (0.042) (0.042) 
GDP growth (t-2) -0.019 -0.014 -0.029 -0.018 
 (0.040) (0.040) (0.041) (0.041) 
Revenues  -0.101  -0.140 
  (0.133)  (0.125) 
Revenues (t-1)  -0.049  -0.314** 
  (0.134)  (0.125) 
Revenues (t-2)  0.092  -0.014 
  (0.133)  (0.126) 
Expenditure  -0.286**  0.123 
  (0.132)  (0.193) 
Expenditure (t-1)  -0.034  -0.115 
  (0.133)  (0.193) 
Expenditure (t-2)  0.086  -0.062 
  (0.131)  (0.188) 
Consolidation 0.036  -0.078  
 (0.067)  (0.068)  
Consolidation (t-1) 0.007  -0.082  
 (0.067)  (0.068)  
Consolidation (t-2) -0.025  0.002  
 (0.068)  (0.069)  
     
Observations 662 662 611 611 
R-squared 0.395 0.401 0.447 0.452 
Countries 21 21 21 21 
R-squared within 0.395 0.401 0.447 0.452 
R-squared between 0.921 0.928 0.954 0.941 
R-squared overall 0.407 0.417 0.468 0.475 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Source: A&A (2010), OECD Economic Outlook No. 84, own calculations. 
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Figure 4: Effects of a 1 percent of GDP fiscal consolidation  
 
 
 
Note: t=0 denotes the year of a 1 percent of GDP fiscal consolidation on GDP. Dotted lines delineate one 
standard error confidence bands.  
 
 
 
Figure 5: Effects of a 1 percent of GDP revenue-based fiscal consolidation  
 
 
 
Note: t=0 denotes the year of a 1 percent of GDP revenue-based fiscal consolidation on GDP. Dotted 
lines delineate one standard error confidence bands. 
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Figure 6: Effects of a 1 percent of GDP expenditure-based fiscal consolidation  
 
 
 
 
 
Note: t=0 denotes the year of a 1 percent of GDP expenditure-based fiscal consolidation on GDP. Dotted 
lines delineate one standard error confidence bands. 
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Appendix 
 
 
Table A1 
 
Fiscal Stimuli (BFI) 
 
Country  Fiscal Stimuli (c.a. with the Blanchard method) 
 
Australia 1990  1991 
Austria 1975 2004 
Belgium 1975 1981 2005 
Canada 1975 1982 1991 2001 
Denmark 1974 1975 1980 1981 1982 
Finland 1978 1982 1983 1987 1990 1991 1992 2001 2003 
France  1975 1981 1992 1993 2002 
Germany 1995 2001  
Greece  1981 1985 1989 1995 2001 
Ireland  1974 1975 1978 2001 2007 
Italy  1972 1975 1981 2001   
Japan  1975 1993 1998 2005 2007 
Netherlands 1975 1980 1995 2001 2002 
New Zealand 1988 
Norway 1974 1976 1977 1986 1987 1991 1998 2002 2007 
Portugal 1978 1985 1993 2005 
Spain  1981 1982 1993 
Sweden 1974 1977 1978 1979 1980 1991 1992 2001 2002 
Switzerland  
U. Kingdom 1971 1972 1973 1990 1991 1992 2001 2002 2003 
United States 2002 
 
Source: A&A (2010), OECD Economic Outlook No. 84, own calculations. 
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Table A2 
 
Fiscal Adjustments (BFI) 
 
Country  Fiscal Adjustment (c.a. with the Blanchard method) 
 
Australia 1987 1988 
Austria 1984 1996 1997 2005 
Belgium 1982 1984 1987 2006 
Canada 1981 1986 1987 1994 1995 1996 1997 
Denmark 1983 1984 1985 1986 2005 
Finland 1973 1976 1981 1984 1988 1994 1996 1998 2000 
France  1979 1996 
Germany 1996 2000 
Greece  1976 1986 1991 1994 1996 2005 2006 
Ireland  1976 1984 1987 1988 1989 2000 
Italy  1976 1980 1982 1990 1991 1992 1997 2007   
Japan  1984 1999 2001 2006 
Netherlands 1972 1973 1983 1988 1991 1993 1996  
New Zealand 1987 1989 1993 1994 2000 
Norway 1979 1980 1983 1989 1996 2000 2004 2005 
Portugal 1982 1983 1986 1988 1992 1995 2002 2006 
Spain  1986 1987 1994 1996  
Sweden 1981 1983 1984 1986 1987 1994 1995 1996 1997 2004 
Switzerland  
U. Kingdom 1977 1982 1988 1996 1997 1998 2000 
United States  
 
 
Source: A&A (2010), OECD Economic Outlook No. 84, own calculations. 
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Table A3 
 
Fiscal Stimuli (CAPB) 
 
Country  Fiscal stimuli (CAPB) 
 
Australia 1991 
Austria 1975 2004 
Belgium 1972 1980 1981 2005  
Canada  1975 1977 2001 
Denmark 1975 1982  
Finland 1978 1979 1982 1987 1990 1991 1992 2001 
France    
Germany 1995 2001  
Greece  1981 1985 1988 1989 1995 2001 2003 2004 
Ireland  2001 2007 
Italy  1975 1981 2001 
Japan  1972 1975 1978 1993 1998 
Netherlands 1975 1978 1989 1995 2001 
New Zealand 1988 
Norway 1987 1990 1991 1992 1996 2000 2003 
Portugal 1985 1993 2005 
Spain  1990 
Sweden 1974 1977 1978 1979 1980 1991 1992 2001 2002 
Switzerland  
U. Kingdom 1973 1978 1990 1992 2002 2003 
United States 1975 2001 2002 
 
Source: OECD Economic Outlook No. 84, own calculations. 
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Table A4 
 
Fiscal Adjustments (CAPB) 
 
Country  Fiscal adjustment (CAPB) 
 
Australia 1998 
Austria 1984 1996 1997 2001 2005 
Belgium 1977 1982 1984 1993 2006 
Canada 1981 1986 1987 1995 1996 1997 
Denmark 1983 1984 1986 2004 2005 
Finland 1981 1984 1988 1994 1996 1998 2000  
France  1996 
Germany 1996  
Greece  1986 1987 1991 1994 1996 2005 2006 
Ireland  1983 1984 1986 1987 1988  
Italy  1976 1982 1983 1991 1992 1993 1997 2007   
Japan  1984 1999 2006 
Netherlands 1972 1983 1991 1993 1996 2004  
New Zealand 1987 1989 2000 
Norway 1983 1994 1995 2007  
Portugal 1982 1983 1984 1986 1992 2002 2006 
Spain  1987 1992 1996   
Sweden 1976 1981 1986 1987 1994 1996 1997 1998 
Switzerland  
U. Kingdom 1980 1982 1996 1997 1998 
United States 1976 
 
 
Source: OECD Economic Outlook No. 84, own calculations. 
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Table A5 
 
Fiscal Stimuli (UPB) 
 
Country  Fiscal stimuli (UPB) 
 
Australia 1991 
Austria  
Belgium   
Canada  2001 
Denmark 1987  
Finland 1982 1983 1987 1991 1992 2001 
France    
Germany 2001  
Greece  1981 1985 1989 1995 2000 2003 
Ireland  1990 1995 2001 2007 
Italy  1981 2003 
Japan  1993 1994 
Netherlands 1989 2001 
New Zealand  
Norway 1987 1991 1992 1996 2000 2003 
Portugal 1987 1993 
Spain  1990 
Sweden 1991 1992 2001 2002 
Switzerland  
U. Kingdom 1992 2002 2003 
United States 2001 2002 
 
 
Source: OECD Economic Outlook No. 84, own calculations. 
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Table A6 
 
Fiscal Adjustments (UPB) 
 
Country  Fiscal adjustment (UPB) 
 
Australia 1987 
Austria 1984 1996 1997 2001 
Belgium 1982 1983  1984 1987 1993 
Canada 1981 1986 1995 1996 1997 
Denmark 1983 1984 1986 2005 
Finland 1981 1984 1988 1994 1998 2000  
France   
Germany   
Greece  1982 1986 1990 1994 1996 
Ireland  1983 1984 1986 1987 1988 1994  
Italy  1982 1993 1995 2006   
Japan  1984  
Netherlands 1983 1991 1993 2004  
New Zealand 1992 1994 2000 
Norway 1983 1994 1995 2007  
Portugal 1982 1983 1992 1995 2006 2007 
Spain  1992   
Sweden 1983 1987 1996 1997 
Switzerland 2000 
U. Kingdom 1981 1995 1996 1997 1998 
United States  
 
 
Source: OECD Economic Outlook No. 84, own calculations. 
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Table A7: 40 largest cases of economic downturns 
Country Year BFI DCAPB DGAP BFI>1.5 CAPB<-1.5 
Finland 1991 4.73 -2.90 -7.88 1 1 
Japan 1974 -0.09 0.69 -5.60 
  Italy 1975 3.56 -1.63 -5.58 1 1 
Canada 1982 2.02 -1.20 -5.52 1 
 Portugal 1993 2.59 -2.34 -5.00 1 1 
Finland 1992 1.75 -1.64 -4.73 1 1 
Portugal 1984 -0.65 1.53 -4.65 
  United States 1982 0.34 -1.02 -4.63 
  Belgium 1975 2.53 0.34 -4.37 1 
 Canada 1991 1.65 -0.67 -4.28 1 
 Spain 1993 3.47 -0.48 -4.09 1 
 United Kingdom 1980 -0.66 1.79 -3.91 
  Greece 1987 -1.17 2.47 -3.78 
  Austria 1975 3.22 -2.16 -3.73 1 1 
Sweden 1977 4.56 -3.16 -3.71 1 1 
Australia 1991 2.61 -1.96 -3.62 1 1 
United States 1974 0.05 -0.09 -3.61 
  Switzerland 1991 0.32 -0.09 -3.44 
  Ireland 1986 -0.22 1.50 -3.40 
  Austria 1978 0.35 0.44 -3.36 
  Ireland 1983 -1.39 3.42 -3.36 
  Japan 1998 5.38 -6.06 -3.28 1 1 
United States 1980 0.24 -0.74 -3.23 
  United States 1975 1.34 -2.85 -3.22 
 
1 
France 1975 1.96 -0.52 -3.20 1 
 Portugal 1983 -2.39 3.91 -3.19 
  United Kingdom 1991 1.64 -0.62 -3.17 1 
 New Zealand 1991 -0.43 1.10 -3.16 
  Australia 1982 0.39 -0.10 -3.16 
  Denmark 1981 1.99 -1.36 -3.16 1 
 United Kingdom 1981 0.82 0.47 -3.09 
  Sweden 1993 -0.72 0.38 -3.07 
  Ireland 1991 0.73 0.06 -3.04 
  Austria 1981 -0.32 1.24 -3.03 
  United States 1991 -0.60 0.39 -3.02 
  Australia 1983 0.12 0.19 -2.96 
  Norway 1989 -2.97 -0.74 -2.94 
  United Kingdom 1974 -0.16 0.65 -2.91 
  Belgium 1993 -0.67 2.10 -2.91 
  Norway 1988 -0.12 -0.36 -2.89 
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Table A8: 40 largest cases of economic upswings 
Country Year BFI DCAPB DGAP BFI<-1.5 DCAPB>1.5 
United Kingdom 1973 2.26 -3.75 4.95 
  Portugal 1988 -1.92 1.12 4.39 1 
 Denmark 1976 -1.01 0.07 4.06 
  Ireland 1990 -0.06 -1.49 3.87 
  Greece 1978 -0.04 -1.09 3.81 
  United States 1984 0.85 0.02 3.67 
  Norway 1985 -1.15 0.37 3.63 
  Portugal 1989 -0.08 -0.88 3.59 
  Japan 1973 -0.36 -0.12 3.59 
  Finland 1979 1.00 -1.69 3.47 
  Portugal 1987 0.73 -1.09 3.25 
  Australia 1984 0.13 -0.22 3.19 
  Japan 1972 0.86 -1.77 3.13 
  Finland 1997 -1.07 1.14 3.08 
  Belgium 1973 -1.09 -0.32 3.07 
  Finland 1989 -1.12 0.21 3.04 
  Italy 1976 -2.43 2.15 3.01 1 1 
Canada 1984 -0.77 -0.07 2.99 
  Spain 1987 -2.88 1.71 2.98 1 1 
Ireland 1997 -1.10 0.15 2.90 
  Denmark 1994 0.62 -0.60 2.89 
  Finland 1988 -3.34 2.37 2.85 1 1 
Japan 1988 0.15 -0.07 2.76 
  United Kingdom 1988 -1.66 0.63 2.75 1 
 Belgium 1976 0.02 -0.92 2.74 
  Denmark 1986 -3.64 3.55 2.73 1 1 
New Zealand 1994 -2.07 1.40 2.69 1 
 Austria 1979 -0.29 -0.23 2.66 
  Greece 1988 1.01 -2.02 2.56 
  United States 1973 -0.55 0.40 2.55 
  New Zealand 1993 -1.89 1.05 2.53 1 
 Netherlands 1976 -0.21 0.83 2.53 
  Canada 1973 -1.06 0.47 2.50 
  Belgium 1988 -0.45 -0.81 2.45 
  United States 1978 0.08 0.17 2.43 
  Italy 1979 0.03 -0.61 2.41 
  Sweden 1984 -2.30 1.20 2.41 1 
 Ireland 1999 0.35 -1.27 2.34 
  Canada 1999 -0.79 0.33 2.29 
  Canada 1988 -0.72 0.26 2.28 
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Figure A1: Indicators of fiscal policy (no c.a. and underlying) vs. output gap 
 
a) PB, no c.a. b) CAPB, underlying 
 
c) Revenues, no c.a. d) Revenues, underlying 
 
e) Expenditure, no c.a. f) Expenditure, underlying 
 
Source: OECD Economic Outlook No. 84, own calculations. 
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Figure A2: Effects of a 1 percent of GDP fiscal consolidation (no c. a. vs. underlying) 
 
 
 
Note: t=0 denotes the year of a 1 percent of GDP fiscal consolidation on GDP. Dotted lines delineate one 
standard error confidence bands. 
 
Figure A3: Effects of a 1 percent of GDP revenue-based fiscal consolidation (no c. a. 
vs. underlying) 
 
 
Note: t=0 denotes the year of a 1 percent of GDP revenue-based fiscal consolidation on GDP. Dotted 
lines delineate one standard error confidence bands. 
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Figure A4: Effects of a 1 percent of GDP expenditure-based fiscal consolidation (no c. 
a. vs. underlying) 
 
 
 
Note: t=0 denotes the year of a 1 percent of GDP expenditure-based fiscal consolidation on GDP. Dotted 
lines delineate one standard error confidence bands. 
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